Analisis Kegagalan Pasar pada Layanan Transportasi Online: Perspektif Eksternal dan Asimetri Informasi

Abstract

Online transportation services in Indonesia are often regarded as an innovation that improves market efficiency. However, efficiency at the level of individual transactions does not necessarily translate into social efficiency. This study analyzes market failure in online transportation services, focusing on negative externalities and information asymmetry, and conceptually examines how the two may reinforce each other. The study uses a descriptive-analytical qualitative approach based on secondary data: microeconomic and Islamic economic literature, official regulations, statistical publications, and partnership documents published by Gojek and Grab, complemented by an illustrative simulation for the urban area of Purwokerto. The analysis applies the private cost–social cost framework and the concepts of hidden information and hidden action. The analysis suggests that: (1) opaque algorithmic incentives are plausibly linked to drivers cruising or waiting without passengers, which may add to congestion and emissions; (2) information asymmetry regarding fare structures, commissions, and penalties weakens drivers’ bargaining position within partnership arrangements; and (3) these two forms of market failure may form a feedback loop that fare and commission regulation alone cannot adequately address. The simulation is a conceptual illustration, not empirical evidence, and cannot be generalized to actual conditions in Purwokerto. This study contributes by integrating two forms of market failure into a single analytical framework and evaluating them through the principles of contractual justice and maqashid al-shariah. The findings suggest that regulatory policy should move beyond fare and commission control toward operational algorithmic transparency and the internalization of external costs, including in the implementing rules of Presidential Regulation No. 27 of 2026.